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Thought Experiments


David Chalmers: Philosophical Zombie

A philosophical zombie is a being indistinguishable from a human in behavior and physiology but lacking conscious experience—no inner life, no qualia. If it walks, talks, and suffers exactly like us, can we say it is truly conscious—or merely simulating consciousness?


Frank Jackson: Mary's Room

Mary’s Room asks whether a brilliant scientist who knows everything about color vision but has only ever seen in black and white gains new knowledge when she sees red for the first time. Does experiencing qualia provide a kind of understanding that knowledge alone cannot?


Android Replacement Quandry - The Color Red

If parts of your brain are gradually replaced with artificial components that interpret sensory data differently—say, seeing red as blue—would you notice the shift or believe you’ve always seen it that way? Does identity depend on stable experience, or on the coherence of memory and interpretation over time?


Donald Davidson: Swampman

Imagine a lightning strike vaporizes you while a molecule-for-molecule duplicate spontaneously forms elsewhere, complete with your memories and behaviors but no causal history. If it thinks, feels, and remembers exactly as you do—is it you, or merely a convincing imitation?


John Searle: The Chinese Room

If a person who doesn’t understand Chinese can still respond convincingly using rulebooks, does that mean they understand the language—or merely simulate it? Can true understanding exist without internal, subjective experience?